Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

12-2019

Improving Access to Justice: Do Contingency Fees Really Work?
Allan C. Hutchinson

Source Publication:
Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 36 (2019)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
Part of the Litigation Commons

Improving Access to Justice: Do Contingency Fees Really Work?
Allan C. Hutchinson*
While not touted as a universal panacea for access problems, contingency fees have
received general praise as an important and justice-improving initiative. By back-loading
the payment of legal fees, the assumption is that the interests of clients and litigants will be
better served. I challenge that received wisdom. While the rise of contingency fee
agreements between lawyers and clients has increased the number of people who can
afford lawyers and make successful claims, the more challenging issue is whether that
increase is being achieved at too high a price to clients and litigants – while more people
are able to bring a case, which they could not otherwise have done, they will be receiving
far less than they might actually be entitled to. In short, do contingency fees work as much
or more to the advantage of lawyers than clients? I suggest not.
Bien qu’ils ne soient pas considérés comme une panacée aux problèmes d’accès, les
honoraires conditionnels sont généralement reconnus comme une initiative importante qui
permet d’améliorer la justice. Le fait d’assujettir le paiement des honoraires juridiques à
certaines conditions est considéré comme une mesure permettant de mieux protéger les
intérêts des clients et des parties aux litiges. Je conteste cette perception. Malgré le fait
que la hausse des accords d’honoraires conditionnels entre les avocats et les clients a
permis à un plus grand nombre de personnes de retenir les services d’un avocat et de faire
valoir avec succès leurs revendications, il faut se demander si le prix que paient les clients
et les parties n’est pas en définitive trop élevé : bien qu’un plus grand nombre de personnes
soient en mesure d’engager des poursuites, ce qu’elles n’auraient pu faire autrement, elles
recevront beaucoup moins que ce à quoi elles pourraient avoir droit en réalité. En d’autres
termes, les honoraires conditionnels sont-ils aussi avantageux ou plus avantageux pour les
avocats que pour les clients ? Je fais valoir que ce n’est pas le cas.
I. INTRODUCTION
‘Access to Justice’ has rightly become a battle-cry for those who want to improve the delivery of legal
services. One of the most enduring and genuine barriers to access is the high cost of lawyers. The plain
fact is that many people simply cannot afford to pay the full price of legal assistance. As a result, their
access to legal justice is severely diminished. Accordingly, without concerted efforts to deal with that
system-wide issue in direct or indirect ways, the push for greater access will be destined to fail. There
are, of course, many ways to achieve that end. One of the more established means to do that is the practice
of contingency fees within personal injury litigation. As the ubiquitous advertisements have it, there is
‘no fee, if no win’: lawyers will not charge any fees unless the claim succeeds and, then, they will take a
percentage of any award or settlement made. Indeed, while not touted as a universal panacea for access
problems, contingency fees have received general praise as an important and justice-improving initiative.
By back-loading the payment of legal fees, the assumption is that the interests of clients and litigant will
*
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be better served.
In this short and provocative essay, I intend to challenge that received wisdom. While the rise of
contingency fee agreements between lawyers and clients has increased the number of people who can
afford lawyers and make successful claims, the more challenging issue is whether that increase is being
achieved at too high a price to clients and litigants – while more people are able to bring a case, which
they could not otherwise have done, they will be receiving far less than they might actually be entitled to.
In short, do contingency fees work as much or more to the advantage of lawyers than clients?1 This essay
is divided into four parts. In the first part, I look at contingency fees generally and their role in the legal
process. The second part explores the traditional rationale for contingency fees. In the third part, I unpack
and challenge the arguments used to defend the continuing use of contingency fees as a device to advance
access to justice. Finally, the fourth part takes a more critical look at contingency fees from a consumerprotection perspective. An overriding theme throughout is that, if access is to be enhanced, then that access
must itself be just. It will hardly help the overall improvement in ‘access to justice’ if the quantity of
access is increased, but the quality of justice is impaired or reduced.
II. THE COSTS OF JUSTICE
The expense incurred in staffing and maintaining the courts is met largely by the state, with the litigant
paying only a minimal sum to utilize these facilities. The major financial burden incurred by the parties is
the cost of legal services. A lesser expense is the payment of incidental expenses, so-called disbursements,
that are incurred throughout the pursuit of a claim. In allocating this burden, the legal system has two
alternative solutions. It can permit costs to lie where they fall and leave parties to pay their own costs,
regardless of the outcome of the claim, or it can order that costs should follow the event and require the
unsuccessful party to pay the costs of the successful party. Whereas the Americans have adopted the
former as a general rule, the Anglo-Canadian legal system has opted for a general rule of indemnity. It is
generally acknowledged that a successful party will receive about 50-60% of the actual legal fees incurred.
Although contingency fee arrangements [CFAs] are a long-standing feature of the American litigation
system, they have only been allowed in Canada in more recent decades. This reflects an historical
antipathy in the Anglo-Canadian system to allowing contingency fees agreements because they are
generally thought to encourage lawsuits. The basic hostility to contingency fees as a form of champertous
agreement is captured by Spiegel J.’s statements in Bergel & Edson v. Wolf:
Rules against maintenance and champerty were introduced over 700 years ago in response
to abusive interference in the legal system by powerful royal officials and nobles. Although
the particular abuses against which the prohibitions were directed had been cured by the
time of the Tudors, the rules continued to survive. In modern decisions concerning
maintenance, courts do not refer to the mediaeval origins of the doctrine, but justify its
continued existence on the basis of public policy considerations. The antipathy of the courts
to champertous agreements similarly is supported by policy concerns. In these expressions
of policy are the roots of the arguments justifying the present ban on contingent fees.2
1

2

My focus is not on the operation of any particular scheme of contingency fees (as they differ slightly from one
jurisdiction to another). Rather, I am more concerned with the overall thrust of the idea and operation of contingency
fees. That said, I have limited my reference to Ontario cases.
Bergel & Edson v Wolf (2000) 50 OR 3rd 777 at para 22. For a general history from an Ontario standpoint, see Andrew
Murray, Contingency Fees What Is Old Is New Again (4 March 2005) Presented at the Trial Lawyers Association MVA
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Nevertheless, a proportionate relation between fees and the amount of damages awarded has always
played a role in fee arrangements, even if a limited and understated one. For instance, in Cohen v. Kealey
& Blaney in 2000, the Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed a list of considerations to be taken into account
by an assessment officer when conducting a fee assessment -- the time expended by the solicitor; the legal
complexity of the matters to be dealt with; the degree of responsibility assumed by the solicitor; the
monetary value of the matters in issue; the importance of the matter to the client; the degree of skill and
competence demonstrated by the solicitor; the results achieved; the ability of the client to pay; and the
client’s expectation as to the amount of the fee.3
The basic rationale for allowing any kind of CFA is that it allows people who cannot afford legal
services to bring claims that they would otherwise have to forego or abandon. This general policy objective
seems unimpeachable in its logic and effect. Parties will be able to proceed in the confidence that they
will not have to make up-front payments to lawyers by way of retainers and that they will not be left with
an enormous economic burden if their claim fails. Of course, this state of affairs is premised on the high
cost of legal services – lawyers’ fees are often perceived to be prohibitive by many potential litigants,
especially when they are already injured or indebted. That said, it also must be recognized that lawyers
should be entitled to a reasonable rate of compensation for services rendered. Whatever the collective
responsibility of the legal profession for this state of affairs, it is simply unjust to expect individual lawyers
to volunteer their services or to accept less for their services than otherwise would be the case.
III. CONTINGENCY FEE AGREEMENTS
The challenge is to ensure that the benefits of CFAs to litigants are not obtained at an exorbitant cost
and that a balance is struck and maintained between the advantages of more claims being litigated and the
costs of doing so. In other words, any legitimate regime of CFAs must work to ensure that both sides of
the equation, litigants and lawyers, are balanced. Access to justice should be obtainable at a reasonable
cost and lawyers should be entitled to fair compensation for their services, but they should not be allowed
to obtain undue financial benefit from the plight of impecunious or vulnerable litigants. In short, although
promoted as a device to benefit litigants, CFAs must not be permitted to operate to prioritize the financial
interests of lawyers over litigants. When a lawyer is paid a percentage of the settlement amount (with the
settlement amount often equaling the insurance limit), a lawyer’s financial incentives will vary
considerably. Under the traditional billing regime, a lawyer knows that he or she will be paid in accordance
with the work that they have done. While this will not in practice be calculated regardless of the outcome,
there is an assurance of some payment.
While this traditional approach to fees presents some risk that the client will not pay, most lawyers
finesse this possibility by requiring retainers up-front. Indeed, under the traditional arrangements, there is
a genuine concern that lawyers will have an incentive to do more work than a file may require. Under a
CFA, a lawyer will face a very different set of incentives. This is because, irrespective of the amount of
hours the contingency fee lawyer puts in, the lawyer will be paid a percentage of the settlement or
judgment amount. While this may incentivize them to ensure that their client wins a substantial amount,
they will also be disincentivized from putting in ‘too much’ time since their compensation remains fixed.
Indeed, the economically optimal approach of lawyers is to ensure that their efforts will lead to an
improved resolution of the case, but only up to a certain point. In other words, rational lawyers under

3

Conference, online: Docplayer < http://docplayer.net/641275-Is-old-is-new-again-contingency-fees-by-andrew-cmurray-london-ontario-presented-conference-march-4-2005-box-2335-n6a4g4-phone-519-640.html>.
Cohen v Kealey & Blaney (1985) 26 CPC (2d) 211 [Cohen] at 215.
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CFAs will strive to maximize their compensation by constantly assessing the cost-benefit of proceeding
further in the case. The cost can simply be seen as the amount of hours the lawyer puts into a case, while
the benefit is their percentage of the total settlement amount. A potential conflict of interest arises if the
lawyer’s incremental financial benefit from proceeding further will cause the lawyer’s effective hourly
rate or total compensation to fall.
According to Richard Posner, the doyen of law-and-economics scholars, the lawyer is effectively a
“co-tenant of the property represented by the plaintiff’s claim” and therefore “may lack an adequate
incentive to exploit the right (to litigate) because the value he creates will accrue in part to another person.”
4
Indeed, this may well incentivize lawyers to settle too early. Again, Posner offers a good example of
this:
“Suppose the plaintiff’s lawyer is offered a settlement of $100,000; if he goes to trial, there
is a 90 percent chance that the plaintiff will win $150,000 but it will cost the lawyer $25,000
worth of his time to try the case; the parties are risk averse; and the contingent fee is 30
percent. If the plaintiff agrees to the settlement, he will net $70,000 and the lawyer $30,000.
If the case goes to trial, the net expected gain to the plaintiff rises to $94,500 (.9 * ($150,000
- $45,000)) but the lawyer’s net expected gain falls to $15,500 ($45,000 * .9 - $25,000).
So there is a conflict of interest between the parties that is due to the fact that the lawyer
does not obtain the whole benefit of a trial (the expected net benefit of trial is ($50,000 *
.9) - $25,000, and is thus positive).”5
In accordance with this perspective, it can be argued that lawyers should be entitled to receive a higher
fee than might otherwise be the case since they are seeking to spread the risk across a range of cases that
have no guarantee of success. So, in assessing the fairness of any fee received by a lawyer under a CFA,
it is important to acknowledge that, in some cases, a lawyer will invest considerable time and effort in a
case that does not produce any or sufficient funds to cover the time expended by the lawyer. However, as
Posner puts it, this “risk is reduced because the lawyer specializing in contingent fee matters can pool
many claims and thereby minimize the variance of the returns.”6 Accordingly, in order to assess the overall
fairness of lawyers’ compensation from CFAs, it would be necessary to obtain data on all files covered by
CFAs to ascertain the relative number of ‘losing’ cases (i.e., the lawyer receives no fees) that are
undertaken by lawyers as well as the relative number of ‘winning cases’ that are undertaken.7
There is also the considerable problem of conflicting interest and so-called double-dipping. In any
settlement negotiations, the defendant lawyer will usually only be interested in the amount of the global
payment made. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s lawyer will have an acute interest in how that lump sum
is to be apportioned. If the plaintiff’s lawyer is simply going to take a flat percentage fee, then there is
little problem. However, there is a problem if the plaintiff’s lawyer is entitled not only to a percentage of
that sum, but also to all of the costs. While the plaintiff’s lawyer will benefit from maximizing the portion
allocated to costs, the client will not; the client’s interests are best served by minimizing the amount of
costs and maximizing the amount apportioned to damages. So, if there is a settlement agreement for a
global amount of $100,000, a plaintiff’s lawyer working on a flat percentage fee of 25% would receive
4
5
6
7

Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 1998) at 614.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Any serious effort to obtain that data will run into considerable difficulties. The personal injury bar is very guarded
about releasing any data for both good and bad reasons. The onus is upon law societies to obtain such important data.
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$25,000. However, if a plaintiff’s lawyer had agreed to a percentage fee of 25% and all costs, that lawyer
would receive much more. Assuming that a settlement had been made for $100,000 and apportioned at
$75,000 for damages and $25,000 for costs, a plaintiff’s lawyer would receive $43,750 (i.e., the $25,000
for costs plus 25% of the $75,000 = $18,750 for a total of $43,750). Although this is a stark example, it
demonstrates how conflicting interest might result in double-dipping – the lawyer gets more than about
75% of what the client receives (i.e., $43,750 to $56,250).8
At the heart of any inquiry into contingency fees is the central question of whether the benefit to
plaintiffs of entering a CFA is being obtained at too high a price to them and at too large an advantage to
lawyers. Litigants may gain from CFAs in that they can litigate in circumstances where they would
otherwise not be able to do so. That said, it must not be to the greater comparative advantage of lawyers
who might receive an unearned windfall in the fees received. In short, is the price of access to justice still
too high? Are lawyers, not claimants, the big winners under the present regime of CFAs?
IV. FIXING THE BASE
A major challenge in making a sensible and reasoned assessment of CFAs is the need to develop a
base-line level of compensation against which any changes in the traditional billing arrangements can be
measured. One possibility recommends itself – to measure what happens across files that have CFAs
against what those files would have generated by way of fees if they had been billed on a traditional hourly
basis. Consider that a lawyer charges an hourly rate of $300; this is about average for an urban personal
injury lawyer (and perhaps is a little conservative). This figure could be said to represent what the lawyer
thinks is a reasonable and achievable rate (less substantial overheads) for their services. The precise
amount will vary from lawyer to lawyer, but this is not important for illustrative purposes; I make no
comments on whether this level of remuneration is considered to be defensible or not as a general matter.
If that lawyer only worked on a traditional hourly basis, they might bill $600,000 annually if they worked
40 hours per week for 50 weeks (i.e., 2000 hours multiplied by $300 per hour).
The total of $600,000 would presumably be arrived at as the cumulative total for both ‘winning’ and
‘losing’ files.9 If lawyers were to earn substantially more than this, then they would seem to be taking
advantage of those clients who were obliged by circumstances to enter into such CFAs. If they were to
earn substantially less than this, then they would be providing their services at a discounted rate. Allowing
for some marginal deviance from the mean (i.e., $550,00 and 650,000), it would seem that neither of these
situations would be fair. Accordingly, CFAs can be evaluated as being fair or not in terms of their effect
on the overall remuneration received by lawyers when measured against the number of hours worked.
As this simple illustration shows, the two key factors in evaluating lawyers’ remuneration are the hours
worked and fees actually received. Although the courts have been prepared to look to other factors (e.g.,
the legal complexity of the matters dealt with; the monetary value of the matters in issue; and the results
achieved),10 it would seem that these factors are folded into the hourly fee able to be charged by the lawyer
and the amount of work required to be done by the lawyer. The more competent the lawyer and the more
successful she or he is, the more that the lawyer will be able to charge clients. Assuming, therefore, that
the lawyer is content with $600.000 as an acceptable level of remuneration for the hours of work done and
8
9

10

See e.g. Hodge v Neinstein, 2015 ONSC 7345. The courts have now outlawed such practices.
By ‘losing’ and ‘winning’ cases, I do not only mean to include those files that are either fully successfully or completely
unsuccessful. By winning, I mean that clients will receive a sizeable amount after their lawyer has been paid that will go
a substantial way to compensating them fairly for their claims and harms.
See Cohen supra, note 3.
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the type of work done, it also seems reasonable that a broadly similar amount should be earned annually
under CFAs. Of course, this is, by necessity, very much a speculative exercise. Any information on the
earnings of lawyers, the fees charged, and the hours worked can only be the subject of conjecture and
anecdote. This lack of information is troubling in itself for a profession that benefits from public
regulation and protection. However, I maintain that it is feasible to make a tentative analysis and to draw
certain conclusions. While the available information does not lend itself to rigorous or quantitative
analysis, its analysis makes for suggestive reading and reveals some tendencies and trends.
There are three important factors in play in determining the fairness of contingency fees – the actual
number of hours worked on a file; the amount of money that is produced by winning files; and the number
of hours worked, but not charged for on losing files. These factors interplay in important and complex
ways. For instance, a lawyer may spend relatively few hours working on a file, but achieve great success
and, therefore receive a very large premium on the usual fees that they would charge. So, on a case that
gives rise to a $100,000 settlement, but only demands 20 hours of work, a lawyer might well recover $2530,000 in fees; this would represent an hourly rate of over $1,250 per hour. One ethical problem here is
that, as well as allowing the lawyer to receive a massive premium on their regular fee of $300 per hour,
the lawyer might be misleading the client in suggesting that a contingency fee is a reasonable way to
proceed on a file that the lawyer has a reasonable sense that it will require only a relatively few hours of
work to achieve a very lucrative outcome (for both lawyer and client).
Conversely, it might be that the lawyer is mistaken in the initial assessment about the amount
recoverable on a file, the chances of success, and the number of hours that will need to be done to achieve
that favourable outcome. So, on a case that the lawyer initially thinks that there is a high likelihood that
it will give rise to a $100,000 settlement and demand only 20 hours of work, an error of judgment will be
significant for the lawyer’s remuneration. Even if the file produces a settlement of $20,000 and the lawyer,
therefore, receives $5-6,000 in fees, the lawyer might well have invested more than 50 hours of work; this
will mean that the lawyer will end up with an hourly fee of only slightly more than $100 per hour. This
would not be a fair outcome for lawyers and provide little incentive for entering into further CFAs with
future clients.
To play out this example and its underlying logic more fully, assume that that the lawyer only did
contingency work. If that lawyer were to take on numerous files and had a 50% success rate, they would
be entitled to charge an amount to their clients that would average out to $600 per hour (or twice their
normal fee of $300) for the winning cases. This would result in them receiving their usual and average
level of annual billing if they were billing on an hourly basis (i.e., $600,000). If that lawyer’s success rate
was 75%, they would be entitled to charge an amount that would average out to $400 per hour (or 1/3rd
or 33% over their normal hourly fee) for the winning cases. This would result in them receiving their
normal level of annual billing of $800,000 if they were billing on an hourly basis.
From a critical perspective, there are two central problems with this – it assumes (1) that the amount
of fees that the lawyers receive in winning cases bears some proportionate connection to the hours actually
worked; and (2) that lawyers are taking on a significant number of losing cases. As regards the first
problem, there is little information available to determine whether there is a connection, however general,
between the fees received and the hours worked. Under most CFAs, there is no requirement for such a
connection to exist; lawyers are under no obligation to justify or even explain the fairness of the fees
received in terms of the actual time spent on the file. Of course, this disconnection might well become
more stark as the amount involved in the dispute increases. It is surely the case that the amount involved
on a file, the complexity of the legal work, and the hours worked are not necessarily interwoven. Whether
the case is worth $10,000, $100,000 or $1M does not in and of itself control the amount of work required
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to be successful. Although a $1M case might take more time than a $10,000 or $100,000 case, there is
little reason to assume that it will take 100 or 10 times more work.
As regards the second problem, there is also little evidence that lawyers are taking on a high percentage
of losing cases. However, much of the discussion about CFAs seems to proceed on the very untenable
assumption that lawyers take on all cases and clients that come into their offices. It would defy logic,
reason and experience to so assume. It would be foolhardy for lawyers to accept files that either have
little chance of success or would demand a very high amount of hours to succeed. The prospects of a high
settlement or judgment might persuade some lawyers to take on a more risk than in files where there is a
lower final outcome and, therefore, less fees will be forthcoming as a percentage of that outcome.
However, this will still be highly constrained by the number of hours that are anticipated to be worked in
order to effect such a favourable outcome. That said, it would remain rare for lawyers to take on files
where the chances of losing are substantial as the effect of taking on losing cases is so dramatic (i.e., no
remuneration for work done). Consequently, it can be assumed that most lawyers are only taking on cases
and files through a CFA if the odds are strongly stacked in favour of a successful outcome and, preferably
where the size of that outcome is larger and the amount of hours worked are lower. While there is no
genuine supply of information to confirm or deny this, these observations only stand to business reason.
Nevertheless, lawyers still make arguments before courts and regulators that the existence of losing
cases warrants a very substantial mark-up in the fees charged and received. However, it is telling that
there is no information available or proffered that backs up such an important and dubious rationale. While
there are cases in which courts have demanded that lawyers provide information about retainers and
dockets, this is far from standard.11 After all, most CFAs are made and enforced without any involvement
by courts. Indeed, there are many instances where courts have actually spoken against a reliance on time
dockets and any connection between the fees received and the hours worked. Whereas one court noted
that “the determination of the proper fee in a CFA is not based on the value of the time spent, but rather
on the amount recovered for the client,”12 another court went so far as to say that “using a percentage
calculation in determining class counsel fees properly places the emphasis on the quality of representation,
and the benefits conferred to the class” and that “a percentage-based fee rewards ‘one imaginative, brilliant
hour’ rather than ‘1000 plodding hours’.”13
V. A CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE
It is now fully accepted that consumers need to be protected against the greater economic and
bargaining power of large merchants and corporations in the marketplace. There is consequently a detailed
and comprehensive set of protections and entitlements (e.g., standard terms, enhanced remedies, etc.) in
both statute and common law that serve to guard the consumer against disreputable and exploitative
practices. If there is a case for such safeguards in the general market (which there surely is), then there is
an even stronger case for protections and entitlements in regard to dealings between lawyers and potential
clients. Both individually and collectively, lawyers operate in a protected and specialized environment
that bestows privilege and power upon them. As part of any social compact, it seems entirely reasonable
that, in acting in the public interest, lawyers have responsibilities and duties to the people they act for and
serve.
In this regard, there are three particular considerations that spring to mind -- the enforcement of legal
11
12
13

See e.g. Young (Litigation Guardian of) v Hinks Estate, 2010 ONSC 2067.
Henricks-Hunter (Litigation guardian of) v 814888 Ontario Inc, 2012 ONSC 4564.
West Coast Soft Wear Ltd v 1000128 Alberta Ltd, 2010 ONSC 6388.
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rights is a mainstay of society’s commitment to democracy and the Rule of Law and should be facilitated,
not hampered by lawyers; the stakes are extremely high for clients, especially those with personal injuries,
who are seeking compensation and recourse for damages caused by the wrongdoing or negligence of
others; and lawyers hold a monopoly as gatekeepers to the legal process and, therefore, have
complementary duties to the public. This combination of factors means that, at a minimum, there should
be appropriate and similar protections in place for lawyers’ clients as in the general consumer context.
However, given the particularly pivotal role of lawyers in the social and political process, protections in
the legal context should perhaps be elevated: there are few groups that have such a pivotal role in the
social and political process.
When persons with personal injuries seek legal assistance to pursue any claims available to them, they
are doubly vulnerable. Not only is there an obvious and large imbalance in knowledge and power between
them and lawyers in regard to the validity, strength and viability of their claims, but they are also in a
debilitated and injured state. In such circumstances, it is essential that the system operates to ensure that
they are not further taken advantage of, especially by their legal advisers. Insofar as lawyers hold
themselves out as a ‘noble profession’ with social duties and responsibilities, they are not simply another
business in the marketplace. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the system, both by way of legislation and
professional regulation, to take decisive steps to ensure that the interests of clients are given the fullest
protection against exploitive and unfair practices and that, conversely, lawyers are restrained from and
penalized for engaging in such practices.
As things stand now, it cannot be confidently reported that the present scheme in regard to CFAs is
operating to protect and advance the interests of clients in their dealings with lawyers. Indeed, the existing
scheme of contingency fees is allowing lawyers to recoup much larger fees than they otherwise might do
under the normal hourly-fee arrangements for services rendered. Again, while lawyers are fully entitled
to receive fair and reasonable fees for the services that they render, there is no plausible case for insisting
that lawyers should be able to cash-in on the opportunities that CFAs afford for enhancing their fees.
Indeed, as contingency fees presently work, there is a concern that the major claim that underpins the
legitimacy and value of contingency fees to advance access to justice is largely unsupported and
unsubstantiated -- that lawyers take on a significant number of unsuccessful cases, such that the lawyer
does not receive adequate fees for the time expended on the file.
Any defence of the existing system demands that this claim be supported. Unless there is a significant
number of ‘losing cases’, the argument in favour of allowing lawyers to receive more by way of fees than
they otherwise would do so becomes unpersuasive. Secondly, unless personal injury claimants can enter
other kinds of fee-arrangements with lawyers and not be simply presented with a take-it-or-leave-it CFA
(even a balanced and reasonable one), they are being exploited by the legal process. The capacity to make
genuine and informed choice is a basic standard that consumers are accorded in other commercial settings.
It is simply unacceptable and against the public interest to have less than that in the lawyering and rightsenforcement context. The legal profession as much as the public at large has a serious interest in ensuring
that ‘access to justice’ is real, and not simply a vague ambition.
VI. CONCLUSION
My brief in this essay has been to question the received wisdom that contingency fees are a tried-andtrue device for improving access to justice. In my opinion, they increase the number of litigants, but only
at a very high price for the clients and litigants; lawyers are the primary beneficiary of such a costs device.
Although there is admittedly little data available to reach any hard-and-fast conclusions, the onus is on
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lawyers to establish that there is some correlation between hours worked and fees received and that they
do take on more than a handful of losing cases. As things stand, it would be wrong-headed for the legal
process to proceed on the basis that both these facts are true. There are many things, large and small, that
courts and regulators could do to improve the situation – introduction of a fee-multiplier for successful
cases rather than a straight percentage; filing of all CFAs with courts; the sampling of the operation of
CFAs by courts; and the obligatory use of standard-form CFAs. Until and even when such reforms are
made, it is incumbent on the legal profession to demonstrate that contingency fees truly contribute to
advancing ‘access to justice’ rather than giving only the false appearance of doing so.

